היי כולם, ביום שני הקרוב (16.9) יבקר אצלנו גיא אבני https://sites.google.com/view/gavni, חוקר מאונ' חיפה שעובד על אימות פורמלי. הוא ייתן הרצאה ב 12:00, וייתכן שיוכל גם להיפגש 1-1, אם מישהו מעוניין.
אשלח פרטים לגבי נושא ההרצאה ומיקומה כשהם יהיו זמינים.
בברכה, גיא
נושא ההרצאה:
Title: Auction-Based Scheduling
Abstract: I will describe a "decentralized synthesis" framework called "auction-based scheduling" in planning domains. Given a pair of non-contradicting objectives, the idea is, rather than constructing a monolithic plan for the conjunction of the objectives, to construct separately two "policies", one for each objective and compose the two policies at runtime. In order to resolve conflicts between the policies’ actions at runtime, we apply a bidding mechanism: each policy is allocated a budget, in each turn, a policy associates a "bid" with their proposed action, and the policy that bids higher, chooses the action and pays the other policy. Algorithms to solve auction-based scheduling rely on results on bidding games on graphs, which I will survey. I will then describe an extension of traditional bidding games, which addresses some of the limitations of auction-based scheduling, by allowing the players' budgets to be "charged" throughout the game by numeric values that appear on the vertices (similar to a gas station).
On Thu, 12 Sept 2024 at 08:39, Guy Katz guykatz@cs.huji.ac.il wrote:
היי כולם, ביום שני הקרוב (16.9) יבקר אצלנו גיא אבני https://sites.google.com/view/gavni, חוקר מאונ' חיפה שעובד על אימות פורמלי. הוא ייתן הרצאה ב 12:00, וייתכן שיוכל גם להיפגש 1-1, אם מישהו מעוניין.
אשלח פרטים לגבי נושא ההרצאה ומיקומה כשהם יהיו זמינים.
בברכה, גיא
-- Guy Katz, PhD Associate Professor, Computer Science School of Computer Science and Engineering, Givat Ram The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ההרצאה תתקיים בחדר B510.
On Thu, 12 Sept 2024 at 12:59, Guy Katz guykatz@cs.huji.ac.il wrote:
נושא ההרצאה:
Title: Auction-Based Scheduling
Abstract: I will describe a "decentralized synthesis" framework called "auction-based scheduling" in planning domains. Given a pair of non-contradicting objectives, the idea is, rather than constructing a monolithic plan for the conjunction of the objectives, to construct separately two "policies", one for each objective and compose the two policies at runtime. In order to resolve conflicts between the policies’ actions at runtime, we apply a bidding mechanism: each policy is allocated a budget, in each turn, a policy associates a "bid" with their proposed action, and the policy that bids higher, chooses the action and pays the other policy. Algorithms to solve auction-based scheduling rely on results on bidding games on graphs, which I will survey. I will then describe an extension of traditional bidding games, which addresses some of the limitations of auction-based scheduling, by allowing the players' budgets to be "charged" throughout the game by numeric values that appear on the vertices (similar to a gas station).
On Thu, 12 Sept 2024 at 08:39, Guy Katz guykatz@cs.huji.ac.il wrote:
היי כולם, ביום שני הקרוב (16.9) יבקר אצלנו גיא אבני https://sites.google.com/view/gavni, חוקר מאונ' חיפה שעובד על אימות פורמלי. הוא ייתן הרצאה ב 12:00, וייתכן שיוכל גם להיפגש 1-1, אם מישהו מעוניין.
אשלח פרטים לגבי נושא ההרצאה ומיקומה כשהם יהיו זמינים.
בברכה, גיא
-- Guy Katz, PhD Associate Professor, Computer Science School of Computer Science and Engineering, Givat Ram The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
-
Guy Katz